ECONOMETRICA2023年第4期

JUL, 2023,VOLUME 91,?ISSUE4

——更多動(dòng)態(tài)，請(qǐng)持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)

Ideology and Performance in Public Organizations

意識(shí)形態(tài)與公共組織績效

J?rg L. Spenkuch, Edoardo Teso, Guo Xu

我們將美國聯(lián)邦政府從1997年至2019年的人事檔案與行政選民注冊(cè)數(shù)據(jù)相結(jié)合，研究政治家與官僚之間的意識(shí)形態(tài)一致對(duì)人員更替和績效的影響。我們記錄了顯著的黨派周期和政治任命人員的更替。相比之下，在公務(wù)員隊(duì)伍中，我們沒有發(fā)現(xiàn)政治周期。在任何時(shí)間點(diǎn)上，相當(dāng)大比例的官僚與其政治領(lǐng)導(dǎo)在意識(shí)形態(tài)上不一致。我們以采購官員為案例研究了這種不一致對(duì)績效的影響。我們利用總統(tǒng)過渡作為政治一致性的“官僚內(nèi)部”變化來源，發(fā)現(xiàn)由不一致官員監(jiān)督的采購合同出現(xiàn)更大的成本超支和延遲。我們提供了與一般的“士氣效應(yīng)”一致的證據(jù)，即不一致的官僚對(duì)追求組織使命的動(dòng)機(jī)較低。因此，我們的研究結(jié)果有助于初步揭示公共組織內(nèi)意識(shí)形態(tài)不一致的成本。

02

Scaling Auctions as Insurance: A Case Study in Infrastructure Procurement

將拍賣作為保險(xiǎn)：基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施采購的案例研究

Valentin Bolotnyy, Shoshana Vasserman

Most U.S. government spending on highways and bridges is done through “scaling” procurement auctions, in which private construction firms submit unit price bids for each piece of material required to complete a project. Using data on bridge maintenance projects undertaken by the Massachusetts Department of Transportation (MassDOT), we present evidence that firm bidding behavior in this context is consistent with optimal skewing under risk aversion: firms limit their risk exposure by placing lower unit bids on items with greater uncertainty. We estimate the amount of uncertainty in each auction, and the distribution of bidders' private costs and risk aversion. Simulating equilibrium item-level bids under counterfactual settings, we estimate the fraction of project spending that is due to risk and evaluate auction mechanisms under consideration by policymakers. We find that scaling auctions provide substantial savings relative to lump sum auctions and show how our framework can be used to evaluate alternative auction designs.

在美國，大部分公路和橋梁的政府支出都是通過“scaling”采購拍賣進(jìn)行的，其中私營建筑公司為完成項(xiàng)目所需的每一件材料提交單位價(jià)格競標(biāo)。利用馬薩諸塞州交通部（MassDOT）進(jìn)行的橋梁維護(hù)項(xiàng)目數(shù)據(jù)，我們提供了證據(jù)表明，在這種情況下，公司的競標(biāo)行為與風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避下的最優(yōu)扭曲一致：公司通過在具有更大不確定性的項(xiàng)目上提出較低的單位出價(jià)來限制其風(fēng)險(xiǎn)暴露。我們估計(jì)了每次拍賣中的不確定性程度以及競標(biāo)者私人成本和風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避的分布。通過反事實(shí)設(shè)置模擬均衡項(xiàng)目級(jí)別出價(jià)，我們估計(jì)了項(xiàng)目支出中由風(fēng)險(xiǎn)導(dǎo)致的比例，并評(píng)估了決策者正在考慮的拍賣機(jī)制。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，與一次性拍賣相比，縮放拍賣提供了相當(dāng)大的儲(chǔ)蓄，并展示了我們的框架如何用于評(píng)估替代拍賣設(shè)計(jì)。

03

General Equilibrium Effects of (Improving) Public Employment Programs: Experimental Evidence From India

（改進(jìn)的）公共就業(yè)計(jì)劃的一般均衡效應(yīng)：來自印度的實(shí)驗(yàn)證據(jù)

Karthik Muralidharan, Paul Niehaus, Sandip Sukhtankar

Public employment programs may affect poverty both directly through the income they provide and indirectly through general equilibrium effects. We estimate both effects, exploiting a reform that improved the implementation of India's National Rural Employment Guarantee Scheme (NREGS) and whose rollout was randomized at a large (sub-district) scale. The reform raised beneficiary households' earnings by 14%, and reduced poverty by 26%. Importantly, 86% of income gains came from non-program earnings, driven by higher private-sector (real) wages and employment. This pattern appears to reflect imperfectly competitive labor markets more than productivity gains: worker's reservation wages increased, land returns fell, and employment gains were higher in villages with more concentrated landholdings. Non-agricultural enterprise counts and employment grew rapidly despite higher wages, consistent with a role for local demand in structural transformation. These results suggest that public employment programs can effectively reduce poverty in developing countries, and may also improve economic efficiency.

公共就業(yè)計(jì)劃可能通過提供的收入直接影響貧困，也可能通過一般均衡效應(yīng)間接影響貧困。我們估計(jì)了這兩種影響，利用一項(xiàng)改革，該改革改善了印度國家農(nóng)村就業(yè)保障計(jì)劃（NREGS）的實(shí)施，其推廣在大規(guī)模（次區(qū)劃）范圍內(nèi)是隨機(jī)的。該改革使受益戶的收入增加了14％，貧困率降低了26％。重要的是，86％的收入增長來自非計(jì)劃收入，這是由于私營部門（實(shí)際）工資和就業(yè)的提高。這種模式似乎更多地反映了勞動(dòng)力市場的不完全競爭，而不是生產(chǎn)率的提高：工人的保留工資增加，土地收益下降，就業(yè)增長在土地集中程度更高的村莊中更高。盡管工資較高，非農(nóng)業(yè)企業(yè)的數(shù)量和就業(yè)也在迅速增長，這與結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型中的地方需求發(fā)揮了作用。這些結(jié)果表明，公共就業(yè)計(jì)劃可以有效地減少發(fā)展中國家的貧困，并可能改善經(jīng)濟(jì)效率。

04

The Effect of Macroeconomic Uncertainty on Firm Decisions

宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)不確定性對(duì)企業(yè)決策的影響

Saten Kumar，Yuriy Gorodnichenko，Olivier Coibion

Using a new survey of firms in New Zealand, we document how exogenous variation in the macroeconomic uncertainty perceived by firms affects their economic decisions. We use randomized information treatments that provide different types of information about the first and/or second moments of future economic growth to generate exogenous changes in the perceived macroeconomic uncertainty of some firms. The effects on their decisions relative to their initial plans as well as relative to an untreated control group are measured in a follow-up survey six months later. We find that as firms become more uncertain, they reduce their prices, employment, and investment, their sales decline, and they become less likely to invest in new technologies or open new facilities. These ex post effects of uncertainty are similar to how firms say they would respond to higher uncertainty when asked hypothetical questions.???

利用對(duì)新西蘭企業(yè)的新調(diào)查，我們記錄了企業(yè)感知的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)不確定性的外生變化如何影響它們的經(jīng)濟(jì)決策。我們使用隨機(jī)信息處理，為一些企業(yè)提供關(guān)于未來經(jīng)濟(jì)增長的第一和/或第二時(shí)刻不同類型的信息，以生成它們感知的宏觀經(jīng)濟(jì)不確定性的外生變化。與初始計(jì)劃相比，以及與未經(jīng)處理的對(duì)照組相比，六個(gè)月后的后續(xù)調(diào)查中測量了對(duì)它們決策的影響。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，隨著企業(yè)變得更加不確定，它們會(huì)降低價(jià)格、就業(yè)和投資，銷售額下降，它們變得不太可能投資于新技術(shù)或開設(shè)新設(shè)施。這些不確定性的事后效應(yīng)與企業(yè)在被問到假設(shè)性問題時(shí)所回答的對(duì)如何應(yīng)對(duì)更高不確定性的方式相似。

Robust Inference on Infinite and Growing Dimensional Time‐Series Regression

無限維和增長維度時(shí)序回歸的穩(wěn)健推斷

Abhimanyu Gupta, Myung Hwan Seo

We develop a class of tests for time-series models such as multiple regression with growing dimension, infinite-order autoregression, and nonparametric sieve regression. Examples include the Chow test and general linear restriction tests of growing rank p. Employing such increasing p asymptotics, we introduce a new scale correction to conventional test statistics, which accounts for a high-order long-run variance (HLV), which emerges as p grows with sample size. We also propose a bias correction via a null-imposed bootstrap to alleviate finite-sample bias without sacrificing power unduly. A simulation study shows the importance of robustifying testing procedures against the HLV even when p is moderate. The tests are illustrated with an application to the oil regressions in Hamilton (2003).

我們開發(fā)了一類用于時(shí)序模型的檢驗(yàn)方法，例如帶有增長維度、無限階自回歸和非參數(shù)篩選回歸的多重回歸。其中包括Chow檢驗(yàn)和增長秩p的一般線性約束檢驗(yàn)等。利用這種逐漸增大的p漸近性質(zhì)，我們引入了一個(gè)新的尺度校正到傳統(tǒng)檢驗(yàn)統(tǒng)計(jì)量中，這個(gè)校正考慮了高階長期方差（HLV），該長期方差會(huì)隨著樣本大小的增加而隨p增大。我們還通過零假設(shè)引入了一個(gè)偏差校正的自助法，以減輕有限樣本偏差而不過分犧牲功效。模擬研究顯示，在p適度時(shí)，將測試程序穩(wěn)健化以抵御HLV的重要性。我們用Hamilton（2003）中的油價(jià)回歸應(yīng)用說明了這些檢驗(yàn)方法。

06

Dynamic Information Provision: Rewarding the Past and Guiding the Future

動(dòng)態(tài)信息提供：回報(bào)過去，引導(dǎo)未來

Ian Ball

I study the optimal provision of information in a long-term relationship between a sender and a receiver. The sender observes a persistent, evolving state and commits to send signals over time to the receiver, who sequentially chooses public actions that affect the welfare of both players. I solve for the sender's optimal policy in closed form: the sender reports the value of the state with a delay that shrinks over time and eventually vanishes. Even when the receiver knows the current state, the sender retains leverage by threatening to conceal the future evolution of the state.

我研究了在發(fā)件人和接收人之間的長期關(guān)系中，信息的最優(yōu)提供方式。發(fā)件人觀察一個(gè)持久且不斷演變的狀態(tài)，并承諾隨著時(shí)間的推移向接收人發(fā)送信號(hào)，后者順序選擇影響雙方福利的公共行動(dòng)。我解出了發(fā)件人的最優(yōu)政策：發(fā)件人報(bào)告狀態(tài)的價(jià)值，但存在隨著時(shí)間的推移而逐漸縮小并最終消失的延遲。即使接收人知道當(dāng)前狀態(tài)，發(fā)件人仍通過威脅隱瞞未來狀態(tài)的演變來保持影響力。

07

Testing Hurwicz Expected Utility

測試赫爾維茲期望效用

Han Bleichrodt, Simon Grant, Jingni Yang

古爾（Gul）和佩森多弗（Pesendorfer）在2015年提出了一個(gè)有前景的不確定性決策理論，他們稱之為赫爾維茲期望效用（HEU）。HEU是α-maxmin歐幾里德期望效用的一種特殊情況，允許對(duì)不確定性來源進(jìn)行偏好。它與大部分有關(guān)風(fēng)險(xiǎn)和不確定性決策的現(xiàn)有實(shí)證證據(jù)一致。我們展示了HEU也是可操作的，可以輕松地進(jìn)行測量和測試。我們通過推導(dǎo)出一種新的兩參數(shù)概率權(quán)重函數(shù)功能形式來實(shí)現(xiàn)這一點(diǎn)，該形式很好地適應(yīng)我們的數(shù)據(jù)，并在模糊感知和模糊規(guī)避之間提供了清晰的分離。在兩個(gè)實(shí)驗(yàn)中，我們發(fā)現(xiàn)支持HEU的預(yù)測，即模糊規(guī)避在不確定性來源之間保持恒定，并且模糊規(guī)避和一階風(fēng)險(xiǎn)規(guī)避之間呈正相關(guān)。

Networks, Phillips Curves, and Monetary Policy

網(wǎng)絡(luò)、菲利普斯曲線和貨幣政策

Elisa Rubbo

This paper revisits the New Keynesian framework, theoretically and quantitatively, in an economy with multiple sectors and input-output linkages. Analytical expressions for the Phillips curve and welfare, derived as a function of primitives, show that the slope of all sectoral and aggregate Phillips curves is decreasing in intermediate input shares, while productivity fluctuations endogenously generate an inflation-output tradeoff—except when inflation is measured according to the novel divine coincidence index. Consistent with the theory, the divine coincidence index provides a better fit in Phillips curve regressions than consumer prices. Monetary policy can no longer achieve the first-best, resulting in a welfare loss of 2.9% of per-period GDP under the constrained-optimal policy, which increases to 3.8% when targeting consumer inflation. The constrained-optimal policy must tolerate relative price distortions across firms and sectors in order to stabilize the output gap, and it can be implemented via a Taylor rule that targets the divine coincidence index.

本文在具有多個(gè)部門和輸入-產(chǎn)出聯(lián)系的經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境中從理論和數(shù)量的角度重新審視了新凱恩斯框架。作為基于基本要素的函數(shù)導(dǎo)出的菲利普斯曲線和福利的分析表達(dá)式表明，所有部門和總體菲利普斯曲線的斜率都隨中間投入份額的減少而下降，而生產(chǎn)率波動(dòng)內(nèi)生地產(chǎn)生了通貨膨脹與產(chǎn)出之間的權(quán)衡，除非通貨膨脹是根據(jù)新的神奇巧合指數(shù)來衡量的。與理論一致，神奇巧合指數(shù)在菲利普斯曲線回歸中提供了比消費(fèi)者價(jià)格更好的擬合。貨幣政策不再能夠?qū)崿F(xiàn)最佳政策，受限最優(yōu)政策下每期GDP損失為2.9％，當(dāng)以消費(fèi)者通脹為目標(biāo)時(shí)，這一損失增加至3.8％。受限最優(yōu)政策必須容忍公司和部門之間的相對(duì)價(jià)格扭曲，以穩(wěn)定產(chǎn)出缺口，可以通過以神奇巧合指數(shù)為目標(biāo)的泰勒規(guī)則來實(shí)施。

09

Growing Like India—the Unequal Effects of Service‐Led Growth

像印度一樣增長-?服務(wù)引領(lǐng)增長的不平等效應(yīng)

Tianyu Fan, Michael Peters, Fabrizio Zilibotti

Structural transformation in most currently developing countries takes the form of a rapid rise in services but limited industrialization. In this paper, we propose a new methodology to structurally estimate productivity growth in service industries that circumvents the notorious difficulties in measuring quality improvements. In our theory, the expansion of the service sector is both a consequence—due to income effects—and a cause—due to productivity growth—of the development process. We estimate the model using Indian household data. We find that productivity growth in nontradable consumer services such as retail, restaurants, or residential real estate was an important driver of structural transformation and rising living standards between 1987 and 2011. However, the welfare gains were heavily skewed toward high-income urban dwellers.

目前大多數(shù)發(fā)展中國家的結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型采取的形式是服務(wù)業(yè)的迅速崛起，但工業(yè)化有限。在本文中，我們提出了一種新的方法來結(jié)構(gòu)性地估計(jì)服務(wù)業(yè)生產(chǎn)率增長，從而避開了測量質(zhì)量改進(jìn)的困難。在我們的理論中，服務(wù)業(yè)的擴(kuò)張既是發(fā)展過程的結(jié)果（由于收入效應(yīng)），也是發(fā)展過程的原因（由于生產(chǎn)率增長）。我們使用印度家庭數(shù)據(jù)估計(jì)了該模型。我們發(fā)現(xiàn)，在1987年至2011年期間，非可交易的消費(fèi)者服務(wù)（如零售、餐飲或住宅地產(chǎn)）的生產(chǎn)率增長是結(jié)構(gòu)轉(zhuǎn)型和生活水平提高的重要推動(dòng)因素。然而，福利收益在很大程度上偏向高收入城市居民。

10

A Theory of Simplicity in Games and Mechanism Design

游戲和機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)中的簡潔性理論

Marek Pycia, Peter Troyan

我們研究了允許代理商僅為他們可能需要做出的一部分未來決策（即計(jì)劃視野）進(jìn)行規(guī)劃的廣泛形式游戲和機(jī)制。隨著游戲的進(jìn)行和新的決策點(diǎn)進(jìn)入他們的計(jì)劃視野，代理商可以更新他們所謂的戰(zhàn)略計(jì)劃。我們引入了一系列簡單性標(biāo)準(zhǔn)，這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)要求規(guī)定的行動(dòng)在計(jì)劃視野之外發(fā)生了什么時(shí)，都能帶來明顯更好的結(jié)果。我們使用這些標(biāo)準(zhǔn)來探討簡單性與其他目標(biāo)之間的權(quán)衡，在廣泛的經(jīng)濟(jì)環(huán)境中刻畫簡單機(jī)制，并勾勒出常見機(jī)制（如報(bào)價(jià)和升價(jià)拍賣）的簡單性，前者比后者更簡單。

Sequential Veto Bargaining With Incomplete Information

不完全信息下的順序否決討價(jià)還價(jià)

S. Nageeb Ali，Navin Kartik，Andreas Kleiner

We study extensive-form games and mechanisms allowing agents that plan for only a subset of future decisions they may be called to make (the planning horizon). Agents may update their so-called strategic plan as the game progresses and new decision points enter their planning horizon. We introduce a family of simplicity standards which require that the prescribed action leads to unambiguously better outcomes, no matter what happens outside the planning horizon. We employ these standards to explore the trade-off between simplicity and other objectives, to characterize simple mechanisms in a wide range of economic environments, and to delineate the simplicity of common mechanisms such as posted prices and ascending auctions, with the former being simpler than the latter.

我們研究了建議者和否決者之間的順序討價(jià)還價(jià)。兩者都有單峰偏好，但建議者對(duì)否決者的理想點(diǎn)不確定。建議者不能承諾未來的提議。當(dāng)玩家都很耐心時(shí)，可能存在具有科斯動(dòng)態(tài)的平衡：否決者的私人信息可以在很大程度上抵消建議者的討價(jià)還價(jià)權(quán)力。然而，我們的主要結(jié)論是，在某些條件下，也存在平衡，建議者可以獲得他在具備承諾權(quán)時(shí)所能獲得的高收益。驅(qū)動(dòng)力是否決者的單峰偏好為建議者提供了一個(gè)“跳躍”的選擇，即早期只與低剩余類型達(dá)成協(xié)議，以后可以可靠地從高類型中提取剩余。在方法上，我們利用了順序討價(jià)還價(jià)與靜態(tài)機(jī)制設(shè)計(jì)之間的聯(lián)系。