Journal of Political Economy 2023年第3期

Volume 131, Issue 3

?

?

——更多動態(tài)，請持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh：理想主義的百年孤獨

?

?

?Risk-Sharing Externalities

風(fēng)險共擔(dān)的外部性
by?Luigi Bocola & Guido Lorenzoni

Financial crises typically occur because firms and financial institutions are highly exposed to aggregate shocks. We propose a theory to explain these exposures. We study a model where entrepreneurs can issue state-contingent claims to consumers. Even though entrepreneurs can use these instruments to hedge negative shocks, they do not necessarily do so because insuring against these shocks is expensive, as consumers are also harmed by them. This effect is self-reinforcing because riskier balance sheets for entrepreneurs imply higher income volatility for the consumers, making insurance more costly in equilibrium. We show that this feedback is quantitatively important and leads to inefficiently high risk exposure for entrepreneurs.

金融危機的發(fā)生通常是因為企業(yè)和金融機構(gòu)高度暴露于總體沖擊之下。我們提出了一個理論來解釋這些暴露。我們研究了一個模型，在這個模型中，企業(yè)家可以向消費者提出國家條件下的索賠。盡管企業(yè)家可以使用這些工具來對沖負(fù)面沖擊，但他們并不一定這樣做，因為防范這些沖擊的保險成本很高，因為消費者也會因此受到傷害。這種效應(yīng)是自我強化的，因為企業(yè)家的資產(chǎn)負(fù)債表風(fēng)險越大，意味著消費者的收入波動性越大，從而使保險在均衡狀態(tài)下成本更高。我們表明，這種反饋在數(shù)量上是重要的，并導(dǎo)致企業(yè)家的低效率高風(fēng)險暴露。

?

?

?What Do Employee Referral Programs Do? Measuring the Direct and Overall Effects of a Management Practice

員工推薦計劃做什么?衡量管理實踐的直接和整體效果
by?Guido Friebel & Matthias Heinz & Mitchell Hoffman & Nick Zubanov

Employee referral programs (ERPs) are randomly introduced in a grocery chain. On direct effects, larger referral bonuses increase referral quantity but decrease quality, though the increase in referrals from ERPs is modest. However, the overall effect of having an ERP is substantial, reducing attrition by 15% and significantly decreasing labor costs. This occurs, partly, because referrals stay longer than nonreferrals, but, mainly, from indirect effects: nonreferrals stay longer in treated than in control stores. The most supported mechanism for these indirect effects is workers value being involved in hiring. Attrition impacts are larger in higher performing stores and better local labor markets.

員工推薦計劃(ERPs)是在連鎖雜貨店隨機引入的。在直接影響上，較大的推薦獎金增加了推薦數(shù)量，但降低了質(zhì)量，盡管erp對推薦的增加是適度的。然而，擁有ERP的總體效果是可觀的，減少了15%的人員流失率，并顯著降低了勞動力成本。出現(xiàn)這種情況的部分原因是，推薦人比非推薦人停留的時間更長，但主要是間接影響:非推薦人在治療店停留的時間比在對照店停留的時間更長。這些間接影響最受支持的機制是工人重視參與招聘。在業(yè)績更好的商店和更好的當(dāng)?shù)貏趧恿κ袌?，人員流失的影響更大。

?

?

?Mixture Choice Data: Revealing Preferences and Cognition

混合選擇數(shù)據(jù):揭示偏好和認(rèn)知
by?Valentino Dardanoni & Paola Manzini & Marco Mariotti & Henrik Petri & Christopher J. Tyson

Mixture choice data consist of the joint distribution of choices of a group of agents from a collection of menus, comprising the implied stochastic choice function plus any cross-menu correlations. When agents are heterogeneous with respect to both preferences and other aspects of cognition, we show that these two determinants of behavior are identified simultaneously by suitable mixture choice data. We also demonstrate how this finding can be extended to allow for specialized assumptions about cognition, focusing on models of random satisficing thresholds and “quantal Fechnerian” choice.

混合選擇數(shù)據(jù)由菜單集合中一組代理的選擇的聯(lián)合分布組成，包括隱含的隨機選擇函數(shù)和任何跨菜單相關(guān)性。當(dāng)代理人在偏好和認(rèn)知的其他方面都是異質(zhì)的，我們表明，這兩個決定行為的因素是通過適當(dāng)?shù)幕旌线x擇數(shù)據(jù)同時確定的。我們還演示了如何將這一發(fā)現(xiàn)擴展到允許關(guān)于認(rèn)知的專門假設(shè)，重點關(guān)注隨機滿足閾值和“量子技術(shù)”選擇的模型。

?

?

?

?Progressive Random Choice

漸進隨機選擇
by?Emel Filiz-Ozbay & Yusufcan Masatlioglu

We introduce a flexible framework to study probabilistic choice that accommodates heterogeneous types and bounded rationality. We provide a novel progressive structure for the heterogeneous types to capture heterogeneity due to varying levels of a behavioral trait. Given an order of alternatives, our progressive structure sorts the types by the extent to which they align with this order. Unlike the random-utility model, our model uniquely identifies the heterogeneity, allowing policy makers to perform an improved welfare analysis. As a showcase, we provide characterization of a well-studied type of bounded rationality: “l(fā)ess-is-more.” In addition, we provide conditions for unique identification of the underlying order for the less-is-more structure.

我們引入了一個靈活的框架來研究適應(yīng)異構(gòu)類型和有限理性的概率選擇。我們?yōu)楫愘|(zhì)性類型提供了一種新的遞進結(jié)構(gòu)，以捕獲由于行為特征的不同水平而引起的異質(zhì)性。給定可選選項的順序，我們的遞進結(jié)構(gòu)根據(jù)它們與該順序?qū)R的程度對類型進行排序。與隨機效用模型不同，我們的模型獨特地識別了異質(zhì)性，使政策制定者能夠進行改進的福利分析。作為展示，我們提供了一種被充分研究的有限理性類型的特征:“少即是多”。此外，我們還為“少即是多”結(jié)構(gòu)的底層順序的唯一標(biāo)識提供了條件。

?

?

When Parents Decide: Gender Differences in Competitiveness

當(dāng)父母決定:競爭力的性別差異
by?Jonas Tungodden & Alexander Willén

Parents make important choices for their children in many areas of life, yet the empirical literature on this topic is scarce. We study parents’ competitiveness choices for their children by combining two large-scale artifactual field experiments with high-quality longitudinal administrative data. We document three main sets of findings. First, parents choose more competition for their sons than daughters. Second, this gender difference can largely be explained by parents’ beliefs about their children’s competitiveness preferences. Third, parents’ choices predict children’s later-in-life educational outcomes. Taken together, these findings provide novel evidence on the role of parents in shaping children’s long-term outcomes.

父母在生活的許多方面為孩子做出重要的選擇，然而關(guān)于這一主題的實證文獻卻很少。本研究通過結(jié)合兩次大規(guī)模人工實地實驗和高質(zhì)量的縱向行政數(shù)據(jù)，研究了父母對子女競爭力的選擇。我們記錄了三組主要的發(fā)現(xiàn)。首先，父母為兒子選擇了比女兒更多的競爭。其次，這種性別差異在很大程度上可以用父母對孩子競爭偏好的看法來解釋。第三，父母的選擇可以預(yù)測孩子日后的教育結(jié)果。綜上所述，這些發(fā)現(xiàn)為父母在塑造孩子的長期結(jié)果中所扮演的角色提供了新的證據(jù)。

?

?

Informationally Simple Incentives

信息簡單激勵
by?Simon Gleyze & Agathe Pernoud

We consider a mechanism design setting in which agents can acquire costly information on their preferences as well as others’. A mechanism is informationally simple if agents have no incentive to learn about others’ preferences. This property is of interest for two reasons. First, it is a necessary condition for the existence of dominant-strategy equilibria in the extended game. Second, this endogenizes an “independent-private-value” property of the interim information structure. We show that, generically, a mechanism is informationally simple if and only if it satisfies a separability condition that rules out most economically meaningful mechanisms.

我們考慮了一種機制設(shè)計設(shè)置，在這種設(shè)置中，代理可以獲得關(guān)于自己和他人偏好的昂貴信息。如果代理人沒有動機去了解他人的偏好，那么機制在信息上是簡單的。有兩個原因引起人們對這個屬性的興趣。首先，它是擴展對策中存在優(yōu)勢策略均衡的必要條件。其次，這內(nèi)化了中間信息結(jié)構(gòu)的“獨立私有價值”屬性。我們表明，一般來說，一個機制是信息簡單的，當(dāng)且僅當(dāng)它滿足可分離性條件，排除大多數(shù)經(jīng)濟上有意義的機制。