Global manufacturing

全球制造業(yè)

The Altasian option

亞洲替代選項

Can Asia’s alternative supply chain steal China’s thunder?

亞洲國家的替代供應(yīng)鏈會搶中國的風(fēng)頭嗎？

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IN 1987 PANASONIC made an adventurous bet on China. At the time the electronics giant’s home country, Japan, was a global manufacturing powerhouse and the Chinese economy was no larger than Canada’s. So when the company entered a Chinese joint venture to make cathode-ray tubes for its televisions in Beijing, eyebrows were raised. Before long other titans of consumer electronics, from Japan and elsewhere, were also piling into China to take advantage of its abundant and cheap labour. Three and a half decades on, China is the linchpin of the multitrillion-dollar consumer-electronics industry. Its exports of electronic goods and components amounted to $1trn in 2021, out of a global total of $3.3trn. These days, it takes a brave firm to avoid China.

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1987年，松下在中國進行了一次大膽的賭博。當(dāng)時，這家電子巨頭的祖國日本是全球制造業(yè)強國，而中國的經(jīng)濟規(guī)模比加拿大還小。因此，當(dāng)松下進入一家中國合資企業(yè)，在北京為其電視機生產(chǎn)陰極射線管時，人們不禁為之側(cè)目。不久，來自日本和其他地方的消費電子巨頭也涌入中國，利用其豐富而廉價的勞動力。35年過去了，中國是價值數(shù)萬億美元的消費電子產(chǎn)業(yè)的關(guān)鍵環(huán)節(jié)。2021年，中國的電子產(chǎn)品和零部件出口總額達到1萬億美元，而全球出口總額為3.3萬億美元。如今，如果一家公司想要避開中國，需要它足夠勇敢。

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Increasingly, however, under a weighty combination of commercial and political pressure, foreign companies are beginning to pluck up the courage if not to leave China entirely, then at least to look beyond it for growth. Chinese labour is no longer that cheap: between 2013 and 2022 manufacturing wages doubled, to an average of $8.27 per hour (see chart). More important, the deepening Sino-American techno-decoupling is forcing manufacturers of high-tech products, especially those involving advanced semiconductors, to rethink their reliance on China.

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然而，在沉重的商業(yè)和政治壓力下，越來越多的外國公司開始鼓起勇氣，即便不完全離開中國，至少也要在中國以外尋求增長。中國勞動力不再那么廉價:2013年至2022年間，制造業(yè)工資翻了一番，達到平均每小時8.27美元(見圖表)。更重要的是，不斷加深的中美技術(shù)脫鉤正迫使高科技產(chǎn)品制造商，尤其是涉及先進半導(dǎo)體的制造商，重新考慮對中國的依賴。

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Between 2020 and 2022 the number of Japanese companies operating in China fell from around 13,600 to 12,700, according to Teikoku Databank, a research firm. On January 29th it was reported that Sony plans to move production of cameras sold in Japan and the West from China to Thailand. Samsung, a South Korean firm, has slashed its Chinese workforce by more than two-thirds since a peak in 2013. Dell, an American computer-maker, is reportedly aiming to stop using Chinese-made chips by 2024.

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根據(jù)研究公司帝國數(shù)據(jù)銀行的數(shù)據(jù)，2020年至2022年間，在中國運營的日本公司數(shù)量從約13600家降至12700家。1月29日，有報道稱，索尼計劃將在日本和西方銷售的相機生產(chǎn)從中國轉(zhuǎn)移到泰國。自2013年達到峰值以來，韓國公司三星已經(jīng)削減了超過三分之二的中國員工。據(jù)報道，美國電腦制造商戴爾計劃在2024年停止使用中國制造的芯片。

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The question for Dell, Samsung, Sony and their peers is: where to make stuff instead? No single country offers China’s vast manufacturing base. Yet taken together, a patchwork of economies across Asia presents a formidable alternative. It stretches in a crescent from Hokkaido, in northern Japan, through South Korea, Taiwan, the Philippines, Indonesia, Singapore, Malaysia, Thailand, Vietnam, Cambodia and Bangladesh, all the way to Gujarat, in north-western India. Its members have distinct strengths, from Japan’s high skills and deep pockets to India’s low wages. On paper, this is an opportunity for a useful division of labour, with some countries making sophisticated components and others assembling them into finished gadgets. Whether it can work in practice is a big test of the nascent geopolitical order.

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對戴爾、三星、索尼和同行們面臨的問題是：在哪里制造產(chǎn)品？沒有一個國家能提供中國龐大的制造業(yè)基礎(chǔ)。然而，綜合來看，亞洲各經(jīng)濟體拼湊起來呈現(xiàn)出一種令人生畏的選擇。它從日本北部的北海道呈新月形延伸，穿過韓國、中國臺灣、菲律賓、印度尼西亞、新加坡、馬來西亞、泰國、越南、柬埔寨和孟加拉國，一直延伸到印度西北部的古吉拉特邦。從日本的高科技和雄厚的財力到印度的低工資，其成員都有各自獨特的優(yōu)勢。理論上，這是一個實現(xiàn)有效分工的機會，一些國家制造復(fù)雜的部件，另一些國家組裝成成品。然而，它能否在實踐中發(fā)揮作用，是對新生地緣政治秩序的一大考驗。

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This alternative Asian supply chain—call it Altasia—looks evenly matched with China in heft, or better. Its collective working-age population of 1.4bn dwarfs even China’s 950m. Altasia is home to 155m people aged between 25 and 54 with a tertiary education, compared with 145m in China —and, in contrast to ageing China, their ranks look poised to expand. In many parts of Altasia wages are considerably lower than in China: hourly manufacturing wages in India, Malaysia, the Philippines, Thailand and Vietnam are below $3, around one-third of what Chinese workers now demand. And the region is already an exporting power: its members sold $634bn-worth of merchandise to America in the 12 months to September 2022, edging out China’s $614bn.

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這條替代性的亞洲供應(yīng)鏈——稱之為Altasia——看起來在分量上與中國旗鼓相當(dāng)，甚至更勝一籌。其14億勞動年齡人口的總和甚至讓中國的9.5億人口相形見絀。Altasia有1.55億年齡在25歲至54歲之間、受過高等教育的人，而中國只有1.45億人——并且，與老齡化的中國形成鮮明對比的是，這些適齡人口的數(shù)量看起來還會增加。Altasia許多地方的工資比中國低得多:印度、馬來西亞、菲律賓、泰國和越南的制造業(yè)時薪低于3美元，大約是中國工人現(xiàn)在需求的三分之一。該地區(qū)已經(jīng)是一個出口大國:在截至2022年9月的12個月里，其成員國向美國出售了價值6340億美元的商品，超過了中國的6140億美元。

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Altasia has also become more economically integrated. All of it bar India, Bangladesh and Taiwan has, helpfully, signed on to the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership (RCEP, which also includes China). By harmonising the rules of origin across the region’s sundry existing trade deals, the pact has created a single market in intermediate products. That in turn has eased regulatory barriers to complex supply chains that run through several countries. Most Altasian nations are members of the Indo-Pacific Economic Framework, a newish American initiative. Brunei, Japan, Malaysia, Singapore and Vietnam belong to the Comprehensive and Progressive Agreement for Trans-Pacific Partnership (CPTPP), which also includes Canada, Chile, Mexico and Peru.

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Altasia的經(jīng)濟也更加一體化。除了印度、孟加拉國和中國臺灣之外，所有其他國家都簽署了《區(qū)域全面經(jīng)濟伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(RCEP，也包括中國)。通過協(xié)調(diào)該地區(qū)現(xiàn)有各種貿(mào)易協(xié)定的原產(chǎn)地規(guī)則，該協(xié)定創(chuàng)造了一個單一的中間產(chǎn)品市場。這反過來又降低了貫穿幾個國家的復(fù)雜供應(yīng)鏈監(jiān)管壁壘。大多數(shù)Altasia國家都是印太經(jīng)濟框架的成員，這是一個新的美國倡議。文萊、日本、馬來西亞、新加坡和越南屬于《全面與進步跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定》(CPTPP)，該協(xié)定還包括加拿大、智利、墨西哥和秘魯。

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A model for the Altasian economy already exists, courtesy of Japanese companies, which have been building supply chains in South-East Asia for decades. More recently Japan’s rich Altasian neighbour, South Korea, has followed its example. In 2020 South Korean firms’ total stock of direct investments in Brunei, Cambodia, Indonesia, Laos, Malaysia, the Philippines, Singapore, Thailand and Vietnam—which together with unstable Myanmar make up the Association of South-East-Asian Nations (ASEAN)—and Bangladesh reached $96bn, narrowly outstripping Korean investments in China. As recently as a decade ago the stock of Korean companies’ investments in China was nearly twice as large as in Altasia. Samsung is the biggest foreign investor in Vietnam. Last year Hyundai, a South Korean carmaker, opened its first ASEAN factory, making electric vehicles in Indonesia.

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得益于日本公司，Altasia經(jīng)濟的模式已經(jīng)存在，這些公司已經(jīng)在東南亞建立了幾十年的供應(yīng)鏈。最近，日本富裕的Altasia鄰國韓國也加入其中。2020年，韓國企業(yè)在文萊、柬埔寨、印度尼西亞、老撾、馬來西亞、菲律賓、新加坡、泰國和越南(加上政局不穩(wěn)定的緬甸組成了東盟)以及孟加拉國的直接投資總額達到960億美元，略微超過韓國在中國的投資。就在10年前，韓國企業(yè)在中國的投資存量幾乎是在亞洲的兩倍。三星是越南最大的外國投資商。去年，韓國汽車制造商現(xiàn)代在印度尼西亞開設(shè)了第一家東盟工廠，用于生產(chǎn)電動汽車。

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For most a link

對于大多數(shù)國家來說，一種鏈接

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Now more non-Altasian firms are eyeing the region, often via their Taiwanese contract manufacturers. Taiwan’s Foxconn, Pegatron and Wistron, which assemble gadgets for Apple, among others, are investing heavily in Indian factories. The share of iPhones made in India is expected to rise from around one in 20 last year to perhaps one in four by 2025. Two Taiwanese universities have teamed up with Tata, an Indian conglomerate with ambitious plans in high-tech manufacturing, to offer courses in electronics to Indian workers. Google is shifting the outsourced production of its newest Pixel smartphones from China to Vietnam.

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現(xiàn)在，越來越多的非Altasia公司開始關(guān)注該地區(qū)，一般是通過與中國臺灣的合同制造商。為蘋果組裝小配件的富士康、和碩聯(lián)合科技和緯創(chuàng)資通等公司正在印度工廠大舉投資。到2025年，印度制造的iPhones的份額預(yù)計將從去年的20分之一左右上升到四分之一。兩所臺灣大學(xué)與印度塔塔集團合作，向印度工人提供電子課程。塔塔集團在高科技制造業(yè)方面有著雄心勃勃的計劃。谷歌正在將其最新款Pixel智能手機的外包生產(chǎn)從中國轉(zhuǎn)移到越南。

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More sophisticated manufacturing, especially of geopolitically fraught semiconductors, is also moving to Altasia. Malaysia already exports around 10% of the world’s chips by value, more than America. ASEAN countries account for more than a quarter of global exports of integrated circuits, easily surpassing China’s 18%. And that lead is growing. Qualcomm, an American “fabless” chipmaker, which sells microprocessor designs for others to manufacture, opened its first research-and-development centre in Vietnam in 2020. Qualcomm’s revenues from Vietnamese chip factories, many of which belong to global giants like Samsung, tripled between 2020 and 2022. Earlier this month the local government of Ho Chi Minh City announced that it was courting a $3.3bn investment from Intel (though it later struck the American chip giant’s name from the statement online).

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更復(fù)雜的制造業(yè)，尤其是充滿地緣政治因素的半導(dǎo)體制造業(yè)，也在向Altasia轉(zhuǎn)移。按價值計算，馬來西亞已經(jīng)出口了全球10%的芯片，超過了美國。東盟國家占全球集成電路出口的四分之一以上，輕松超過中國的18%。這種領(lǐng)先優(yōu)勢正在擴大。美國“無實體工廠”的芯片制造商高通，銷售微處理器設(shè)計方案給別人制造，于2020年在越南開設(shè)了第一個研發(fā)中心。高通從越南芯片工廠獲得的收入在2020年至2022年間增長了兩倍，其中許多工廠屬于三星等全球巨頭。本月早些時候，胡志明市地方政府宣布，它正在爭取英特爾33億美元的投資(盡管后來它從網(wǎng)上聲明中刪除了這家美國芯片巨頭的名字)。

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China’s huge advantage has historically been its vast single market, knit together with decent infrastructure, where value could be added without suppliers, workers and capital crossing national borders. For Altasia to truly rival China, therefore, its supply chain will need to become far more integrated and efficient. Although RCEP has greased the wheels of intra-Altasian commerce somewhat, the flow of goods faces more obstacles than it does within China. Its member countries will need to play to their comparative advantage.

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從歷史上看，中國的巨大優(yōu)勢一直是其龐大的單一市場與良好的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施緊密相連，在這里，供應(yīng)商、工人和資本無需跨越國界就能實現(xiàn)增值。因此，Altasia要想真正與中國競爭，其供應(yīng)鏈需要變得更加完整和高效。盡管RCEP在某種程度上推動了Altasia內(nèi)部的貿(mào)易，但商品流通面臨著比中國更多的障礙。其成員國將需要發(fā)揮自己的比較優(yōu)勢。

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For now the infrastructure that connects them is shabby, at best. Finicky regulations and national ambitions can easily gum up the alternative supply chain. Altasia’s poorer countries are not necessarily keen on the logical division of labour, which would see them play a bigger role in the more menial parts of the electronics supply chain. And forgoing all Chinese-made parts is next to impossible. Thamlev, an American electric-bike startup, moved production from China to Malaysia in 2022 in order to avoid a 25% American tariff, but still needed to import Chinese components. As a result, it took a month longer for its e-bikes to reach American riders.

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目前，連接它們的基礎(chǔ)設(shè)施充其量也只是破舊不堪。過分嚴苛的法規(guī)和國家野心很容易搞亂如今的亞洲替代供應(yīng)鏈。Altasia較貧窮的國家不一定熱衷于合理的勞動分工，這將使它們在電子產(chǎn)品供應(yīng)鏈中發(fā)揮更大的作用，尤其是在低報酬的一端。放棄所有中國制造的零件幾乎是不可能的。美國電動車初創(chuàng)公司Thamlev在2022年將生產(chǎn)從中國轉(zhuǎn)移到馬來西亞，以避免25%的美國關(guān)稅，但仍需要進口中國零部件。結(jié)果，美國騎手多等了一個月才拿到電動車。

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Prospects for deeper integration are hazy, within Altasia and with big consumer markets in the rich world. India, on whose 1.4bn people Altasia’s future may hinge, seems in no rush to join RCEP. Although India has, with its Altasian neighbours, signed up to America’s Indo-Pacific framework, it has opted out of the initiative’s trade provisions. These anyway lack bite: America is in a protectionist mood and has offered neither tariff cuts nor better access to its vast market. One ASEAN policymaker likens the pact to a doughnut, lacking substance in the middle.

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在Altasia內(nèi)部以及與富裕國家的大型消費市場之間，更深層次整合前景并不明朗。Altasia的未來可能取決于印度的14億人民，而印度似乎并不急于加入RCEP。盡管印度與其Altasia鄰國簽署了美國的印太經(jīng)濟框架，但印度選擇退出該倡議的貿(mào)易條款。無論如何，這些都缺乏說服力:美國正處于保護主義情緒中，既沒有降低關(guān)稅，也沒有更好地進入印太經(jīng)濟框架中的巨大市場。一位東盟政策制定者將該協(xié)定比作一個甜甜圈，中間缺乏實質(zhì)內(nèi)容。

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Altasia will certainly not replace China soon, let alone overnight. In January, for example, Panasonic announced a big expansion of its Chinese operations. But in time China is likely to become less attractive to foreign manufacturers. Chinese labour is not getting any cheaper and its graduates are not getting much more numerous. America may yet realise that reducing its reliance on China in practice requires closer ties with friendly countries, including membership of the CPTPP, the precursor of which collapsed after America pulled out in 2017. And as a budding alternative to China, Altasia has no equal.

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Altasia肯定不會很快取代中國，更不用說一夜之間。例如，今年1月，松下宣布大幅擴張其在中國的業(yè)務(wù)。但隨著時間的推移，中國對外國制造商的吸引力可能會下降。中國的勞動力并沒有變得更便宜，其大學(xué)畢業(yè)生的數(shù)量也沒有增加多少。美國可能還沒有意識到，在實踐中減少對中國的依賴需要與友好國家建立更密切的關(guān)系，包括加入全面與進步跨太平洋伙伴關(guān)系協(xié)定（CPTPP），其前身在2017年美國退出后崩潰。作為中國的新興替代者，Altasia無可匹敵。