經(jīng)濟(jì)學(xué)頂刊American Economic Review 2023年第3期
American Economic Review 2023年第3期
Vol. 113 No. 3 March 2023
?
?
——更多動態(tài),請持續(xù)關(guān)注gzh:理想主義的百年孤獨(dú)
?
?
When a Doctor Falls from the Sky: The Impact of Easing Doctor Supply Constraints on Mortality
當(dāng)一個醫(yī)生從天而降:緩解醫(yī)生供應(yīng)限制對死亡率的影響
Edward N.?Okeke
This paper describes the results of a policy experiment conducted in coordination with the Nigerian government. In this experiment, some communities were randomly selected to receive a new doctor. These doctors were posted to the local public health center. Prior to their arrival, health care was provided by midlevel health-care providers (MLP). To separate the effect of (ostensibly higher) quality from that of quantity, another group of communities was provided with an additional midlevel provider. A third group of communities received no additional workers. No other inputs were provided. I find a measurable decrease in mortality in communities assigned a doctor but not in communities assigned an MLP, suggesting that quality in the health-care sector is a significant constraint.
本文描述了與尼日利亞政府協(xié)調(diào)進(jìn)行的一項政策實驗的結(jié)果。在這個實驗中,一些社區(qū)被隨機(jī)選擇接受一名新醫(yī)生。這些醫(yī)生被派往當(dāng)?shù)毓残l(wèi)生中心。在他們到達(dá)之前,保健由中級保健提供者提供。為了將質(zhì)量(表面上更高)的影響與數(shù)量的影響區(qū)分開來,為另一組社區(qū)提供了額外的中級提供者。第三組社區(qū)沒有增加工人。沒有提供其他投入。我發(fā)現(xiàn),在有醫(yī)生的社區(qū),死亡率有明顯下降,但在有初級保健計劃的社區(qū),死亡率卻沒有下降,這表明衛(wèi)生保健部門的質(zhì)量是一個重大制約因素。
?
?
Relinquishing Riches: Auctions versus Informal Negotiations in Texas Oil and Gas Leasing
放棄財富:德克薩斯州石油和天然氣租賃的拍賣與非正式談判
Thomas R.?Covert?and?Richard L.?Sweeney
This paper compares outcomes from informally negotiated oil and gas leases to those awarded via centralized auction. We focus on Texas, where legislative decisions in the early twentieth century assigned thousands of proximate parcels to different mineral allocation mechanisms. We show that during the fracking boom, which began unexpectedly decades later, auctioned leases generated at least 55 percent larger up-front payments and 40 percent more output than negotiated leases did. These results suggest large potential gains from employing centralized, formal mechanisms in markets that traditionally allocate in an unstructured fashion, including the broader $3 trillion market for privately owned minerals.
?
?
An Alternative Explanation for the "Fed Information Effect"
“美聯(lián)儲信息效應(yīng)”的另一種解釋
Michael D.?Bauer?and?Eric T.?Swanson
Regressions of private-sector macroeconomic forecast revisions on monetary policy surprises often produce coefficients with signs opposite to standard macroeconomic models. The "Fed information effect" argues these puzzling results are due to monetary policy surprises revealing Fed private information. We show they are also consistent with a "Fed response to news" channel, where both the Fed and professional forecasters respond to incoming economic news. We present new evidence challenging the Fed information effect and supporting the Fed response to news channel, including: regressions that control for economic news, our own survey of professional forecasters, and financial market responses to FOMC announcements.
?
Partisanship and Fiscal Policy in Economic Unions: Evidence from US States
經(jīng)濟(jì)聯(lián)盟中的黨派之爭與財政政策:來自美國的證據(jù)
Gerald?Carlino,?Thorsten?Drautzburg,?Robert?Inman?and?Nicholas?Zarra
Partisanship of state governors affects the efficacy of US federal fiscal policy. Using close election data, we find partisan differences in the marginal propensity to spend federal intergovernmental transfers: Republican governors spend less than Democratic governors. Correspondingly, Republican-led states have lower debt, (delayed) lower taxes, and initially lower economic activity. A New Keynesian model of partisan states in a monetary union implies sizable aggregate effects: The intergovernmental transfer impact multiplier rises by 0.58 if Republican governors spend like Democratic governors, but due to delayed tax cuts, the long-run multiplier is higher with more Republican governors, generating an intertemporal policy trade-off.
?
?
Not Too Late: Improving Academic Outcomes among Adolescents
為時不晚:提高青少年的學(xué)業(yè)成績
Jonathan?Guryan,?Jens?Ludwig,?Monica P.?Bhatt,?Philip J.?Cook,?Jonathan M. V.?Davis,?Kenneth?Dodge,?George?Farkas,?Roland G.?Fryer?Jr.,?Susan?Mayer,?Harold?Pollack,?Laurence?Steinberg?and?Greg?Stoddard
Improving academic outcomes for economically disadvantaged students has proven challenging, particularly for children at older ages. We present two large-scale randomized controlled trials of a high-dosage tutoring program delivered to secondary school students in Chicago. One innovation is to use paraprofessional tutors to hold down cost, thereby increasing scalability. Participating in math tutoring increases math test scores by 0.18 to 0.40 standard deviations and increases math and non-math course grades. These effects persist into future years. The data are consistent with increased personalization of instruction as a mechanism. The benefit-cost ratio is comparable to many successful early-childhood programs.
?
?
Subjective Performance Evaluation, Influence Activities, and Bureaucratic Work Behavior: Evidence from China
主觀績效評價、影響活動與官僚主義工作行為:來自中國的證據(jù)
Alain?de Janvry,?Guojun?He,?Elisabeth?Sadoulet,?Shaoda?Wang?and?Qiong?Zhang
Subjective performance evaluation could induce influence activities: employees might devote too much effort to pleasing their evaluator, relative to working toward the goals of the organization itself. We conduct a randomized field experiment among Chinese local civil servants to study the existence and implications of influence activities. We find that civil servants do engage in evaluator-specific influence to affect evaluation outcomes, partly in the form of reallocating work efforts toward job tasks that are more important and observable to the evaluator. Importantly, we show that introducing uncertainty about the evaluator's identity discourages evaluator-specific influence activities and improves bureaucratic work performance.
主觀的績效評估可能會引發(fā)影響活動:員工可能會投入過多的精力來取悅評估者,而不是朝著組織本身的目標(biāo)努力。我們在中國地方公務(wù)員中進(jìn)行了隨機(jī)現(xiàn)場實驗,以研究影響活動的存在及其影響。我們發(fā)現(xiàn),公務(wù)員確實參與了評估人員特定的影響,以影響評估結(jié)果,部分形式是將工作努力重新分配到對評估人員更重要和更可觀察的工作任務(wù)上。重要的是,我們表明,引入關(guān)于評估者身份的不確定性會阻礙評估者特定的影響活動,并提高官僚主義的工作績效。
?
?
Persuasion through Slanted Language: Evidence from the Media Coverage of Immigration
語言傾斜性說服:來自媒體對移民報道的證據(jù)
Milena?Djourelova
I study the persuasive effects of slanted language, exploiting a ban on the politically charged term "illegal immigrant" by the Associated Press (AP) news wire. My empirical strategy combines the timing of the ban with variation across media outlets in their baseline reliance on AP copy. I document sizable diffusion of the ban from AP copy to media outlets. Moreover, individuals exposed to the ban through local media show significantly lower support for restrictive immigration policies. This effect is more pronounced for moderates and in locations with fewer immigrants, and does not transfer to views on issues other than immigration.
我研究了傾斜語言的說服力,利用美聯(lián)社(AP)新聞專線禁止使用具有政治意味的“非法移民”一詞。我的經(jīng)驗策略結(jié)合了禁令的時機(jī)和各媒體對美聯(lián)社拷貝的基線依賴的差異。我記錄了大量從美聯(lián)社拷貝到媒體的禁令擴(kuò)散。此外,通過當(dāng)?shù)孛襟w了解禁令的個人對限制性移民政策的支持明顯降低。這種影響在溫和派和移民較少的地區(qū)更為明顯,并且不會轉(zhuǎn)移到對移民以外問題的看法上。
?
?
Nonlinear Pricing with Underutilization: A Theory of Multi-part Tariffs
利用不足的非線性定價:多部分電價理論
Roberto?Corrao,?Joel P.?Flynn?and?Karthik A.?Sastry
We study the nonlinear pricing of goods whose usage generates revenue for the seller and of which buyers can freely dispose. The optimal price schedule is a multi-part tariff, featuring tiers within which buyers pay a marginal price of zero. We apply our model to digital goods, for which advertising, data generation, and network effects make usage valuable, but monitoring legitimate usage is infeasible. Our results rationalize common pricing schemes including free products, free trials, and unlimited subscriptions. The possibility of free disposal harms producer and consumer welfare and makes both less sensitive to changes in usage-based revenue and demand.
我們研究了一種商品的非線性定價,這種商品的使用為賣方帶來收入,買方可以自由處置。最優(yōu)的價格表是一個多部分關(guān)稅,其特點(diǎn)是買家支付的邊際價格為零。我們將我們的模型應(yīng)用于數(shù)字產(chǎn)品,廣告、數(shù)據(jù)生成和網(wǎng)絡(luò)效應(yīng)使使用變得有價值,但監(jiān)控合法使用是不可行的。我們的研究結(jié)果合理化了常見的定價方案,包括免費(fèi)產(chǎn)品、免費(fèi)試用和無限訂閱。自由處置的可能性損害了生產(chǎn)者和消費(fèi)者的福利,并使兩者對基于使用的收入和需求的變化不那么敏感。